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1. Introduction  
The rapid increase in pharmaceutical expenditure and the need to control the health care budget has 
sparked renewed interest in pricing policies (Claxton, 2007). 
Rising costs are a challenge to healthcare policy makers because high prices put budgetary pressure on 
governments who try to maintain access to drugs for the population at an affordable cost.
3 For this reason, 
most EU member states control the prices of reimbursable medicines. 
The aim of these regulatory mechanisms is to find an optimal trade-off between the need to incentivate 
R&D, to protect consumers and to secure value for  money in the use of public funds. The market for 
pharmaceuticals is not, for various reasons, a competitive market.
4 The demand side is characterized by 
uncertainty on the effectiveness of the drug and patients' inability to translate their need for improved health 
into the demand for a specific treatment. The agency relationship between the patient and the physician
5 
means that that choice of the drug is largely entrusted to the latter, with a possible distortion of the market. 
The regulations and restrictions laid down by Government agencies in this sector are themselves a source of 
distortion. Pharmaceutical price regulation methods in non-US markets are heterogeneous and include, for 
example, direct price regulation through a negotiation process (e.g. France and Italy) and indirect price 
regulation through limits on reimbursement under social insurance programmes (e.g. Germany and Japan) 
(Danzon and Chao, 2000b; Capri and Levaggi, 2002; 2007). 
One  of  the  most  innovative  methods  applied  in  pricing  schemes  is  represented  by  the  risk-sharing 
agreements. Risk sharing occurs when the risks involved (in this case the cost of a particular drug therapy) 
are shifted from one stakeholder to another, from the government to the industry and vice versa, in order to 
alleviate some of the concerns about uncertainty. There are two types of risk sharing: performance-based and 
financial-based contracts. Performance-based contracts focus on the efficacy of the product, whereas risk-
sharing financial-based agreements involve cost per patient. Liuc Papers n. 233, maggio 2010 
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Such risk-sharing arrangements for pharmaceuticals can be used to report high quality when product 
quality is not fully observable. While there may be difficulties in devising such schemes for every product, 
risk-sharing agreements may become an essential feature of the market in the future (Cook et al, 2008). 
The aim of this paper is to study the effects of risk-sharing in markets for highly targeted new drugs. In 
this environment we can assume that ex ante the treatment is always appropriate and that the effectiveness of 
the drug does not depend on the number of patients to be treated. 
2. Risk-sharing concepts 
In the listing process the industry has an interest in showing that the drug is very effective in order to 
increase its probability of being listed and, possibly, to obtain a high price. The number of patients have a 
countervailing effect on expected profits since they reduce the probability of being listed, but they increase 
profits if the outcome of the listing process is positive. 
Once  the  drug  has  been introduced,  almost  all  regulatory  systems  require  greater  effort in the post-
marketing monitoring of drugs, not only from a purely medical perspective (DePouvourville, 2006). Public 
authorities, in fact, schedule procedures to control the drug for possible side effects. However, only a few of 
them verify the real ex post value for money of the drug. In particular, only a few regulators impose a form 
of penalty if the effectiveness falls short of the declared efficacy and/or the volume is greater than what was 
agreed. 
This failure to verify efficacy and volume ex post creates perverse effects on the regulatory system. The 
industry, in fact, has an interest in overestimating the efficacy and underestimating the number of people that 
will benefit from the drug in the listing process, given that both parameters will not be controlled by the 
regulator ex post. 
In general, it is very difficult and costly to verify the discrepancy between efficacy and effectiveness. For 
very costly and targeted drugs such as cancer drugs it is possible to verify their effectiveness ex post. This is 
because the number of patients is limited and already controlled. In Italy, for instance, a specific registry for 
expensive cancer drugs has been created and for some of these drugs the risk-sharing scheme is applied.
6 The 
patient is registered in the website and treatment is initially paid by the Italian NHS. If treatment fails 
(progressive disease or unacceptable toxicity at or before the agreed time), the pharmaceutical company 
reimburses  (money  or  corresponding  amount  of  drug)  the  whole  delivered  treatment  or  50%  of  it.  An 
example  for  the  UK  is  Janssen-Cilag's  Velcade  (bortezomib,  see  NICE,  2007)  in  which  patients  who 
demonstrate a 50% response rate at first relapse are eligible to continue treatment on the NHS, otherwise the 
manufacturer refunds the NHS. 
On the theoretical side, a new strand of literature is developing to study risk-sharing. Zaric and O'Brien 
(2005) study the effects of rebates in the pricing mechanism when the quantity sold exceeds the negotiated 
quantity. As for the effectiveness of the drug, Barros (2010) studies the welfare properties of specific risk-
sharing  mechanisms  while  Zaric  and  Xie  (2009)  examine  two  different  risk-sharing  agreements  in  an 
intertemporal setting. In their model the company applies for listing, proposes a price and sets a marketing Liuc Papers n. 234, Serie Economia e Impresa 63, luglio 2010 
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strategy to sell the drug. The efficacy of the latter is a random variable and a penalty is imposed on the firm 
if  the  ex  post  efficacy  (the  effectiveness)  falls  below  a  specific  threshold.  The  penalty  may  consist  in 
delisting in the second period or in a rebate. The authors show that depending on the environment, one or the 
other instruments perform better both from the industry and the purchaser point of view. 
In  this  paper  we  propose  a  very  general  modelling  framework  that  allows  study  of  the  risk-sharing 
properties of several pricing schemes, their effects on the number of patients treated and on the expected 
profit of the company selling the drug. Our framework allows for differentiation between risk-sharing and 
risk-shifting schemes and has important policy implications: the number of patients that are treated is not 
necessarily affected by risk-sharing/risk-shifting unless the listing procedure itself is changed; the price for 
which the drug is listed may be higher than without risk-sharing, but the expected profit of the industry is: a) 
always lower for risk-shifting schemes; b) for true risk-sharing it depends on the bargaining power of the 
company. 
The article will be organised as follows: in the following section we present the model, in section ; in 
section and we present our pricing scheme with and without risk-sharing respectively; in section we show 
how our pricing mechanism can be used to represent most of the systems used by regulators; in section we 
show the difference between a risk-sharing and a risk-shifting scheme and argue why a company may still 
prefer to be listed with risk-shifting. Finally in section the main conclusions of our paper are drawn. 
3. The model 
In the market we analyse, patients are treated using a drug that is currently listed and has the following 
characteristics: 
·  the drug is relatively new; data on the theoretical efficacy are available, the results concerning ex 
post effectiveness are not known; 
·  the effectiveness  ° E  of the drug lies within a range of values  ) , 0 ( L  with a known uniform 
probability so that the expected effectiveness  ° ED  is equal to  ; 2
L
  
·  the listed price of this drug is  ° p  while the quantity that maximises expected profit is equal to 
x°.  As a consequence, the expected budget is  ; ° ° = ° x p B   
·  the regulatory process by which the drug has been approved and listed is the same as the one that 
will be used for the new product. 
A new drug is about to be marketed to treat the same condition. Its effectiveness E  lies within a range of 
values  ) , 0 ( A   with  a  known  probability  distribution  ) (E g   with  . 1 ) ( ; 0 ) 0 ( = = A G G   To  simplify  the 
exposition, we assume that the distribution of this function is uniform, i.e.  A E g / 1 ) ( =  so that the expected 
effectiveness  ED is equal to  . 2
A
 The marginal cost c to produce the drug is approximated to zero, but the 
firm has to incur a fixed cost F  for research into the drug and marketing. Liuc Papers n. 233, maggio 2010 
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The outcome of the listing process (i.e. the approved price, the level of reimbursement, the limitations) is 
uncertain and depends on the efficacy ( D ), the price (  p  ) and the number of patients to be treated ( x  ). 
The expected effectiveness ( ED ) is derived from the randomised clinical trials the firm has to carry out 
before the drug is approved. To simplify matters, we assume that one unit of the drug is sufficient to treat 
one patient so that the number of doses and the number of patients are equivalent. 
The price p and the number of patients to be treated,  , x  are usually the result of a bargaining between the 
company and the regulator where the price and the quantity may be decided by the firm, by the regulator or 
by the market depending on the regulatory framework (Capri and Levaggi, 2007; Jelovac, 2003; Claxton, 
2007). 
In this bargaining process the regulator takes account of the budget that is necessary to treat patients and 
the value for money of the drug. At the listing stage the latter can observe the expected effectiveness ( ED ) 
which can be verified by both parties through the results of the randomised clinical trials. However, the true 
effectiveness  : (E  the ex-post efficacy) is not known when the price is set. Such uncertainty depends on 
several elements such as the role of compliance, the interactions with other drugs when patients have several 
pathologies and the appropriateness of physicians' prescription behaviour. The firm may have more precise 
information  on  the  likely  effectiveness  of  the  drug  because  it  has  access  to more  information  than the 
minimum required by the regulatory process. In our paper we show that the risk of effectiveness falling short 
of expected efficacy can be partly shifted onto the company that applies for listing. 
We formalise the listing process by assuming that the price of the drug depends on three parameters: 
·   a  which reflects cost effectiveness considerations. It may be interpreted as society's willingness 
to pay in a class of specific treatments and it is set by the regulator. We assume that it is set 
outside the model. 
·   D  which  is  the  efficacy  of  the  drug  that  is  declared  by  the  company  for  reimbursement 
purposes;  it  must  lie  in  the  range  (  A , 0   )  but  it  may  not  necessarily  be  equal  to  expected 
effectiveness,  2 / A  . This is because the firm may be more or less optimistic about the success of 
the drug in treating patients outside the randomised clinical trial; 
·    , z  a rebate on the price if the ex post effectiveness (  E  ) is lower than D .  z  represents the 
risk-sharing element of our formula. 




E D z D p
D 1
0 - - = ∫ a a
                  (1) 
 
 x  is the number of patients that will be treated. We assume that this number is contractible and can be 
verified. Liuc Papers n. 234, Serie Economia e Impresa 63, luglio 2010 
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If the effectiveness falls short of what is declared, the firm will have to pay a rebate proportional to the 
difference between the declared efficacy and true effectiveness  ), ( E D -  but other schemes are compatible 
with our risk-sharing formula as we will show later. 
The company applies for the drug to be reimbursed by the regulator. The latter may or may not decide to 
grant reimbursement; this decision depends on D and on the budget  px B =  that is necessary to take care of 
the possible benefiter (  x  ) of the new drug. Both variables are measured in relation to the market in which 
the new drug is introduced. 
In particular, we assume that the probability of being reimbursed can be defined by  ) , ( ° ° B
B
D
D p  where  ° D  
and B° is the efficacy of the drug and the budget spent for the active principle that is currently used to treat 
patients with the same condition. As in Zaric and O'Brien (2005), the function is assumed to be separable and 
additive in  ° D
D
 and  ° B
B
 . The probability of being listed is increasing in ED and decreasing in  px  .
7 
This function is common knowledge to the actors in the decision process, i.e. the company knows the 
parameters of this function before setting  D . Given that during the negotiation process neither party knows 
the true effectiveness, the budget that the regulator uses in the decision to list the drug is  . D p a =
*
  
The expected profit from listing can be written as: 
 
( ) F x c p px ED E - - = P ) ; ( p                   (2) 
 
The company aims to maximise its expected profit and to do so it has to choose the level of efficacy (  ) D  
and the number of patients ( x  ) that maximises the following function: 
 
( ) F x dE
A
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a
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         (3) 
 
In order to show the differences in terms of price and expected profits between our model and a more 
conventional listing process, we now show how the pricing mechanism would be in our model if there were 
no risk-sharing. 
 
4. The pricing mechanism without risk-sharing 
 
In this section we compare the results of our model with a system where there is no risk-sharing. In the 
absence of any other information, the pricing rule set by the regulator will depend on expected efficacy 
) ( 2
A ED =  : Liuc Papers n. 233, maggio 2010 
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 If listed, the industry receives a price equal to  , 2
A a  independently of  E  , the effectiveness verified ex 
post. The idea behind this pricing mechanism is that in the short run the industry has a limited bargaining 
power in setting the price of the drug that it is about to market. The price is in fact determined by a  and by 
the expected efficacy resulting from the randomised clinical trials which the industry has to perform. 
The only discretionary variable for the company is  , x  the number of patients, which will be determined 
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As in Zaric and O'Brien (2005) we assume that the marginal probability of being listed is linear; the 
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The price of the new drug is outside the control of the industry in the listing process, unless the industry 
can influence the value of  2 / A  through the randomised clinical trial. The number of patients that the 
industry will target for the new drug may be greater or smaller than for the drug already listed. It will depend 




 is in fact the ratio of the marginal 
effect on the probability of being listed deriving from an increase in the effectiveness and in the budget. 
 This ratio may be controlled by the regulator. For example, if the latter wants the same number of 
patients treated with the old and the new drug (  ° =
* x x  ), it will have to put greater weight on the efficacy 
compared to the budget
8. To some extent, this may not be a perverse effect of regulation given that the new 
drugs are more effective, but also more targeted on a restricted number of patients (Pirmohamed and Lewis 
2004; Danzon and Towse, 2002). 
Substituting equation (4) into (5) we can write the expected profit as: Liuc Papers n. 234, Serie Economia e Impresa 63, luglio 2010 
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The profit is increasing in a  and in the efficacy of the new drug, as may be expected. 
5. The pricing mechanism with risk-sharing 
In  this  section  we  introduce  our  proposed  risk-sharing  formula.  The  price  will  be  set  according  to 
equation () and the probability of listing depends on declared efficacy and the maximum budget. 
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If the marginal probability of being listed is linear as in the previous example, the optimal level for  D 
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In this model where the efficacy of the drugs belonging to the same therapeutical class is rewarded in the 
same way, 
* D  does not depend on the threshold set by the regulator ( a  ) but on the rebate it will have to 
pay if the effectiveness falls short of the declared efficacy. a  is an important element in determining the 
profit of the firm, but it does not distort the choices of the company as regards  .
* D  It interesting to note that 
unless  , 3
4 ³ z  the company will always apply using the maximum possible level of efficacy  ). (A  This result 
is driven by the fact that by increasing 
* D  the expected profit increases (listing is more certain) even if the 
risk of paying a fine is higher. Liuc Papers n. 233, maggio 2010 
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By comparing equation (7) with equation (10) we can see that the number of patients which the company 
is applying to treat is the same, i.e. our risk-sharing formula does not alter the decisions of the company as 
regards the number of patients for whom it is agreed the new treatment will be made available if listed. 
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As in the previous case, the profit is increasing in  . a  In this case it is also decreasing in z,  as might be 
expected. 
6. Other risk-sharing mechanisms 
The agreement presented in the previous section envisages a rebate proportional to the difference between 
declared efficacy and effectiveness. In everyday application of risk-sharing, other mechanisms are often 
used. Some cancer drugs are reimbursed to the company only if they are effective by different combination 
of schemes: e.g. in Italy nilotinib and sorafenib are not reimbursed after the second cycle of therapy if the 
patient does not respond to the first cycle; avanstin is fully reimbursed only for respondent patients after 15 
cycles; sprycell is reimbursed at 50% of the price if there is a progression of the disease after the first cycle. 
In this case a threshold for reimbursement is defined in relation to the level of declared efficacy. In other 
words, the agreement between the pharmaceutical company and the regulator takes this form: 
 
sD E if p
sD E if D p
< =
³ =
       0
        a
 
 
where 0  1 £ £ s  is a parameter set by the regulatory authority. For  1 = s  the company is reimbursed only 
if the ex post effectiveness is at least equal to the declared efficacy; for values smaller than one, the company 
has more room for manoeuvre. 
This risk-sharing mechanism is similar to the one proposed by Barros (2010). In this case the profit for 
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As in the previous examples, if the marginal probability of being listed is linear, the optimal level for D 
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The quantity for which the company requests listing is the same as in the no risk-sharing case. In this case 
our model does not predict an increase in the number of cases treated, a possible problem that Barros (2010) 
points out for risk- sharing agreements. The difference in the results of the two models is explained by the 
presence in our approach of a listing process also in the case in which the drug is reimbursed only if it is 
effective. Such result has important policy implications: risk-sharing does not necessarily mean that more 
patients will be treated, unless the listing process is changed. In our example the rules for being listed do not 
change: the probability of being listed still depends on the effectiveness of the drug and the budget and in 
this case the number of patients that will be treated is independent of the pricing mechanism. 
Instead of paying for the effective therapies, the regulator may envisage a rebate if effectiveness falls 
below a specific level. In this case the company is paid a price  , D p a =  but it will have to pay a fixed rebate 
D ka  if the effectiveness falls short of a specific threshold  . sD   
In other words, the agreement between the pharmaceutical company and the regulator takes this form: 
 
sD E if D k p
sD E if D p
< - =
³ =
       ) 1 (
       
a
a
                  (14) 
 
where 0  1 £ £ k  is a parameter set by the regulator authority. For  1 = k  the payback is equal to the 
price paid to the company the price is equivalent to the one we have described in the previous 
section. This risk-sharing mechanism is similar to the one proposed by Zaric et al. (2009). In this 
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As in the previous examples, if the marginal probability of being listed is linear, the optimal level for  D 
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The parameters k  and s  play a similar role in this model. From a policy point of view this means that the 
regulator may choose the payback level and the threshold independently, but it is the combination of these 
two parameters that determine the choice of the industry. 
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This formula represents the profit both for the case in which only the effective therapies are paid for (in 
which case  ) 1 = k  and the more general case of a rebate. As in the previous case, the profit is increasing in 
. a  In this case it is also decreasing in  , ks  as might be expected. From a policy point of view it is interesting 
to note that if  2
z ks =  the two systems are equivalent, i.e. the industry fixes the same price and has the same 
profit. 
For this reason, below we study the effects of risk-sharing only with reference to the first model proposed. 
 
7. Policy implications 
In this session we try to answer the following question: who are the gainers and the losers of a risk-
sharing mechanism? 
From a purely economic point of view, one of the most important arguments for not introducing risk-
sharing mechanisms is that they may increase the price of the drugs, hence public expenditure. The company 
on the other hand may feel that the system is depressing expected profit. In our model, given the assumption 
of no marginal production costs as regards the drug, we can simply compare the expected profit of the 
company under the two arrangements. In fact, given the assumption of zero marginal costs to produce the Liuc Papers n. 234, Serie Economia e Impresa 63, luglio 2010 
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drug, public expenditure and expected profit differ because of  , F  hence the comparison can be made simply 
for the profits. 
In the model presented here there is no effect on the target number of patients which is the same under the 
two  systems,  provided  that  the  listing  process  is  the  same  for  drugs  with  and  without  risk-sharing 
agreements. As for the profit, it is necessary to compare equation (11) with equation (8). 
In appendix 2 we show that independently of the level chosen for z  (i.e. z ≤ 3 / 4  and z > 4/3) ), the profit 
for the company is always lower under a risk-sharing agreement. 
This allows  us to  conclude  that  a risk-sharing  mechanism  like  the  one  we have  proposed is  always 
preferred by the regulator. In fact, the number of patients that are going to be treated is the same, but the ex 
post price (net of the rebate) is lower than in a system where the expected effectiveness is reimbursed. 
This means that from an economic point of view such a scheme should not be defined risk-sharing but 
risk-shifting (Towse and Garrison, 2010). The company in fact agrees to receive an expected profit that is 
lower than without this scheme. For a true risk-sharing mechanism, the cost per QALY threshold ( ) a  should 
be set higher in the risk-sharing mechanism. Let's call this value  . 1 a  In particular, it can be shown that for 
z a a 8
9
1 =  the company is indifferent between the two agreements. This equation shows two interesting 
facts: the first is that  a a > 1  as expected; the second is that  1 a  is increasing in z,  i.e. the higher the penalty, 
the higher the price under a risk-sharing scheme. 
This result has important policy implications; for very expensive drugs when a  is the maximum value 
that  society  is  willing  to  pay  for  QALY 
11,  the  agreements  currently  proposed  are  in  fact  risk-shifting 
practices. The company, confronted with an all or nothing offer, prefers to reduce its expected profit against 
the alternative of not being listed and it is for this reason that it accepts the agreements. Some experts argue 
that risk-sharing is second option for the pharmaceutical industry: if the normal process fails because the 
drug is too costly, the company enters a risk-sharing agreement. Our model adds one important element to 
this discussion: entering such a risk-shifting agreement is equivalent to accepting a reduction in the price of 
the new drug. The company may prefer this solution for several reasons: 
the price will be based on a declared efficacy which may be higher than the expected value. In the short 
run this declaration may be used as a message to physicians and competitors on the confidence the company 
has in the healing properties of the new drug; 
the company may have acquired new evidence on the effectiveness of the new drug or how to better 
target the patients and it may prefer to risk paying a penalty than receive a lower price. 
When the threshold a  is not the maximum willingness to pay, a true risk-sharing mechanism may arise. 
In this case the company will ask to be reimbursed at a higher rate than a  and effects on the expected profit 
depend on the bargaining ability of the company. In this case, part of the risk is in fact shifted from the 
regulator to the industry as regards the effectiveness of the new drug a cost that is represented by the increase 
in the expected profit.  Liuc Papers n. 233, maggio 2010 
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8. Conclusions 
In this paper we propose a pricing mechanism to be used both for risk sharing and risk shifting purposes 
based on the effectiveness of the new drug. 
Our model shows the basic difference between risk-sharing and risk-shifting. The first mechanism may be 
used by a regulator that wishes to reduce uncertainty concerning the ex post cost effectiveness of the drug. 
The second mechanism is instead used to reduce the expected price of the drug and is compatible with 
situations  where  the  drug  is  very  costly  and  its  effectiveness  highly  uncertain.  In  this  framework  the 
company may have an interest in accepting a reduction in its profit through a risk-sharing mechanism instead 
of through a straight price reduction. In this way it may have advantages in terms of market signalling about 
the confidence the company has in the effectiveness of the new drug. Furthermore, the company may be able 
to use new evidence on the true effectiveness of the treatment to target the patients, hence improving the 
expected effectiveness. 
The price at which the new drug is listed is always higher than in a system without risk sharing, but the 
expected profit is lower unless the efficacy is reimbursed at an higher rate. This consideration has important 
policy implications: in the presence of risk sharing the listing price is not a good proxy for value for money. 
It is only ex post, when the true effectiveness will be known that value for money can be evaluated. In a risk-
sharing  agreement  in  fact  it  is  necessary  to  take  account  of  the  rebates  that  the  firm  may  incur  if  the 
effectiveness falls short of what promised. 
At the time of listing, the expected profit of the firm is a better proxy for value for money because it takes 
account of these rebates. 
Our formula creates incentives for the company to target the number of people that will be treated instead 
of increasing it like the risk-sharing mechanism proposed by NICE in 2007 for bortezomib (Barros 2010). 
The reason for this different result can be explained as follows: in our approach we use the probability of 
listing of the new drug and risk sharing on the price while NICE substitutes the listing process with the risk 
sharing agreement on the price. Our model shows that risk sharing is not a substitute for total expenditure 
considerations; on the contrary the two instruments should be used together. 
The framework we use highlights the effects of the listing process on the number of patients that the 
company propose to treat in the long run. Our model shows in fact that the number of patients the company 
proposes to treat depends on the relative weight that is given in the decision process to the efficacy and to 
budget considerations. This means that all the parameters of the pricing formula have to be carefully assessed 
to  avoid  perverse effects (Claxton  et  al.  2008).  For  this reason, this  note  represents just  a first  step  in 
studying new ways of defining prices for drugs in a regulated market. Liuc Papers n. 234, Serie Economia e Impresa 63, luglio 2010 
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Appendix 1: The optimal D* and x* 

















































We can take account of the constraint using Khun Tucker conditions: 



































Let's assume that the constraint is not binding. The above equations can be solved as a system of linear 
equations. The non-negative solutions are the following couples: 
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The first solution is not feasible, only the second can be considered. However this solution is valid only if 
3
4 > z   
For  3
4 < z  the constraint is binding and the problem can be written as: 
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p ° = x x
  Liuc Papers n. 234, Serie Economia e Impresa 63, luglio 2010 
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Appendix 2: Profit under the two pricing mechanisms 
Given that there are two solutions for risk-sharing, we have to compare two different cases 
  
3 / 4 ) > z a   
 
In this case the difference in the profit can be written as: 
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Given that D  z
L
3
4 = °   
the equation above can be written as: 
 














which is equal to 0 for  9 / 8 = z . For values above this threshold, the equation is negative, for values 
below it is positive. Since the equation for the profit with risk-sharing is valid only if  3 / 4 > z  the difference 
is always negative. 
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This expression is equal to zero if  1 = z  which, however, implies no risk-sharing. For  1 < z  it is negative, 
but has no economic meaning. Liuc Papers n. 233, maggio 2010 
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Notes 
 
1 Institute of Economics, Cattaneo-LIUC University, Corso Matteotti, 22, 21053 Castellanza (VA) Italy, e-mail: 
scapri@liuc.it 
2 Department of Economics, University of Brescia, Via San Faustino 74b, 25100 Brescia (Italy), e-mail: 
levaggi@eco.unibs.it 
3In Europe, about 75% of pharmaceutical expenditure is reimbursed from public funds (OECD, 2009) 
4See Zweifel, Breyer and Kifmann (2009) chap.12 and Capri and Levaggi (2007). 
5See Barigozzi and Levaggi (2008) and references therein 
6See http://antineoplastici.agenziafarmaco.it/ 
7i.e.  0
) ; ( > ¶
¶
ED
px ED p  and  0 2




px ED p  and  0
) ; ( < ¶
¶
px






px ED p   
8i.e. if 
1 p  (the marginal probability of being listed directly correlated with the efficacy) is twice 
2 p  (the probability of 
being listed inversely correlated with the budget). 
9See appendix one 
10See appendix one. 
11For instance, in the UK, NICE (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence) has fixed the maximum cost for 
a QALY (quality-adjusted life year) gained at £ 30,000. 
 